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As several case-studies have shown, trying to keep economic migrants out has had, among others, the side effect of allowing for the development of networks of human smugglers (Koser 1997; McDowell 1997; Salt and Stein 1997; Ghosh 1998; Messe et al 1998; Morrison 1998; Van Hear 1998; Koslowsky 2000; Peter 2000; Salt and Hogarth 2000; Snyder 2000) . While migration control policies have not specifically targeted asylum seekers, they have, nevertheless, affected them in much the same way as other groups of migrants, forcing them to resort to illegal migration to reach Western Europe and therefore criminalising them in blatant contradiction with international law governing the status of refugees (Engbersen and Van der Lun 1998; Van Hear 1998) .
In 2000, the UN adopted a Protocol against human smuggling, testifying to the growing concern by state authorities and international organisations who view migrant smuggling and trafficking as undermining international collaborative efforts to produce ordered migration flows 1 . In the 1990's, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) conducted a vast policy-oriented research programme on the topic, which was also the subject of several academic studies (IOM 1994; IOM 1995; Ghosh 1998; Meese et al. 1998; Salt and Hogarth 2000; Snyder 2000) . J. Salt and J. Stein (1997) even devised a model for analysing smuggling as a business, dividing it into three stages: the mobilisation and recruitment of migrants in their countries of origin, their movement en route along transit stages, their integration into labour markets and societies in the host countries. Despite contributing rich documentary and theoretical perspectives on a new field, the various approaches adopted in these studies have three major limitations. First, when considering the transit process of irregular migrants originating from developing countries, they are almost all located at the gateway of Western industrialised states and leave the first stages of migration and smuggling in the shadow. Second, even the very few ones that document smuggling in one transit country in the South take for granted that migrants from developing countries systematically aim at reaching the West from the beginning of their migration. Third, like the policies that allow smuggling rings to thrive and that criminalise migrants whatever their profile, these studies do not clearly differentiate between patterns of voluntary and involuntary migration. A few studies avoid this pitfall by looking specifically at the smuggling of asylum seekers. Unfortunately, they all concentrate on the last stage of irregular migration, either looking at transit across Central or Eastern European countries, or at smuggling between EU member states (Koser 1997; McDowell; Morrison 1998; Koslowsky 2000) . Again, very little is revealed of the transit and smuggling process of asylum seekers in their regions of origin or at other stages along the route.
Moreover, recent trends of studies on international migration emphasise their transnational character and point at the role played by social and economic networks in prompting, facilitating, sustaining and directing the movement of migrants especially to industrialised countries and their mobility between various regions of the world (Portes 1995; Van Hear 1998; Vertoec and Cohen 1999) . Applying these paradigms to the study of forced migrants, a few pioneering works now show that non-European refugees and asylum seekers have found it increasingly difficult to gain admission to industrialised countries unless they have been able to activate broad, transnational networks composed of individuals of different migrant categories, in particular to pay for the services of smugglers (Koser 1997; McDowell 1997; Muss 1997; Crisp and Van Hear 1998; Koser and Lutz 1998; Morrison 1998; Doraï 2002) .
Several of these studies emphasise the role of networks based on common affiliations such as ethnicity, kinship, residential proximity or religion. But again, because these studies are located at one end of the route in the country of destination, they cast little light on transit while it is an essential process posing a link, and not a disruption, in migrants' trajectories and in the architecture and dynamics of the various networks that sustain their move.
In all cases, the first transit stage(s) of irregular asylum migration in countries of the South has not been explored in depth, and a series of questions still need to be asked.
The first set of questions is related to the motivations of asylum migrants. What are the initial intentions of forced migrants when they leave their country of origin? Why do a number of them prefer to seek asylum in an industrialised country rather than in a state closer to home? What about the treatment they receive in regional host countries, their socio-economic conditions and legal status in first countries of reception and the impact of these factors on migration strategies? In brief, does pointing at such pull factors as lenient asylum policies or economic prosperity in industrialised countries explain current trends of asylum migration and the complex motivations of migrants who undertake long, costly and risky transcontinental journeys?
The second set of questions concerns the various means at the disposal of migrants to undertake long distance and irregular moves. decision to merely transit Jordan, their first host country, rather than staying there long term. It a context of extreme vulnerability, poverty, and religious-based discrimination, it will also look at the support networks of migrants in Jordan, with a particular emphasis on religious ones. Finally, it will document the smuggling process as it takes place from Jordan, a country that concentrates the prerequisites for smuggling rings to operate, unlike Iraq.
Combining sociological and anthropological approaches, this paper will argue that the structural context in the first regional host country plays a major part in shaping the strategies of forced migrants, in determining their transit, and in allowing for the development of smuggling and trafficking rings that intersect with migrants' socialhere, religious -networks to allow for further emigration to Western industrialised countries. In passing, it will also challenge a number of accepted views on the distinctions between trafficking and smuggling and about the so-called pull of industrialised countries.
I. BACKGROUND

I.1. Iraqi forced migrants
In 1996, 4 million Iraqis were reported to live abroad (USCR 1996) , of whom over 600,000 are currently recognised (Convention or other) refugees 2 . They were over 1,320,000 in 1992, the peak year. In 2001, Iraqis were the third main refugee caseload in the world.
Following a first wave of forced migration during the Iran-Iraq war (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) Jordan has adopted what can be deemed a "semi-protectionist" policy towards Iraqi forced migrants, i.e. letting them in but depriving them of a status, of protection and of means of livelihood (Chatelard 2002 
I. 3. Methodology
Iraqi migrants in/across Jordan are in many ways "invisible" migrants if one is to judge by how neglected they are in the grey literature produced by international organisations, human rights groups, or Jordanian public bodies or civil society organisations (NGOs, research centres, etc.). They are the object of no specific study and are usually only mentioned in passing. Moreover, Jordanian officials are not available to discuss the issue and the Jordanian press is of limited use. Consequently, I
had to combine a multiple methodology to gather sociological data and background information. 
II. PROFILE, CONDITIONS, LIVELIHOOD STATEGIES
To assess the migrants' socio-economic profile, legal status, and livelihood strategies in Jordan, I made mainly, but not exclusively, use of the survey conducted with asylum seekers at UNHCR, Amman. The aim of the survey was also to identify the pull factors that had made them chose Jordan as a first host country, the reasons why they did not want to stay, and their intentions of further emigration provided their claim for asylum was rejected
II. 1. Socio-economic profile
Among respondent to the survey, men were 56,3% and women 43,7%. 64,6% of all respondents were between 25 and 39 years old, while 23,7% were between 40 and 69 years old. The large female representation should not be taken as an indication that
Iraqi migrant women are generally almost as numerous as migrant men. From other observations, it rather seems that women are over represented among asylum seekers because they are more vulnerable than men and approach UNHCR more frequently to provide for some kind of status and protection. A large majority of the respondents were Shiites (66,8%), followed by Christians This was the case with 67,8% of the Christians and Sabeans, and 1/3 of the Shiite respondents who said that they had sold everything they had.
II. 2. Socio-economic situation in Jordan
As regards their socio-economic situation in Jordan, only 7,2% of the male respondents said they did not work at all. But of those working, only 2,3% had a work permit, and 71,6% said that they worked on and off as street vendors, cleaners, painters and other petty jobs. The other rough 20% who had a steady job were cleaners, gardeners, or office boys. 74,5% of the women were totally unemployed, and those working were also domestic workers or were working as seamstresses at home. Only two had an illegal but steady clerical job.
The average monthly income respondents declared to earn was 40 Jordanian Dinars (JD) 7 for a single person and 70 JD for a household, unsteady in 84,5% of the cases.
Those who had the highest income were benefiting from the financial support of relatives abroad, and/or had arrived recently in Jordan and were still living on their savings. In Jordan, the poverty line is estimated below 100 JD a month for a household and all people interviewed, including outside the survey sample, felt that they were experiencing a dire professional and social downfall and had been placed in a much lower social status than the one they belonged to in Iraq. As employment is scarce, unsteady and not well paid, and as the cost of living in Jordan is up to 10 times higher than in Iraq, migrants who come with savings spend them in a few months.
After a period of being relatively well off, most survive at the margin of the Jordanian society, engaging in menial jobs in the informal sector, and facing an extremely precarious economic situation.
Their situation is further aggravated by their housing conditions. Iraqi migrants concentrate in the cities where they can live in a familiar environment and pass rather unnoticed, and where they hope to maximise their social and economic opportunities.
While 87,4% of the respondents resided in Amman, the others lived in urban areas within a radius of 40 km from the capital. Typically, they lived in unsanitary and overcrowded housings in the poverty belt of Amman, and in informal/squatter areas with a high Palestinian refugee population. These neighbourhoods can be equated to refugee camps but without the legal status and the facilities (sewage system, electricity and water, health and educational systems).
Only three families among the 54,2% who had school-age children were sending them to school, and they were all Christians benefiting from aid from a Catholic relief society. The other ones answered that they thought schools were not open to Iraqi children, or that they had tried but been told to produce documents they had not taken with them from Iraq.
Finally, 41,3% declared that they currently had, or had had, health problems while in Jordan but only 9,8% had consulted. In 67,3% of the cases, at least one of the respondents' children currently had medical problems too, and 40,1% had been brought to a consultation. All those interviewed said that they gave priority to their children's health over their own. 93,7% of those who had reasons to consult but had not been to a medical facility said that it was too expensive.
II.3. Reasons for choosing Jordan
Open borders and expected work opportunities are the two main reasons respondents gave when asked why they had selected Jordan and not another neighbouring country such as Turkey, Syria or Iran. Possibility to approach UNHCR came only in fourth position after accessibility of third countries, either in the Arab world or in the West.
Other frequent answers (there were multiple possibilities) included the fact that
Jordan was an Arab, and not foreign country, the presence of relatives that had already moved there, or the fact that it was the less risky choice. This calls for a number of remarks. Apart from those who were planning to transit Jordan rapidly, 2/3 of the respondents came to Jordan in view of staying long-term, at least until the political situation at home improved so that they could go back. This fact is confirmed by numerous other persons interviewed in other settings, who said that they would rather stay close to Iraq where they could still communicate with relatives, albeit in a limited fashion, or easily reunite with them if the relatives had to leave. It is only as an ultimate choice that they are/were convinced to undertake further migration out of Jordan.
Finally, despite the fact that all the individuals in the sample survey were registered with UNHCR as asylum seekers, only 17% of them mentioned choosing Jordan because of the possibility of asking for asylum, and among those only a few had heard of UNHCR's office in Amman before they left Iraq. The overwhelming majority learnt about the organisation from other Iraqis in Jordan. While, as an average, respondents had been in Jordan for 22 months (with a minimum of 4 months and a maximum of 51 months), most had waited for about a year before approaching UNHCR, an issue on which I shall go back later.
II.4. Legal documentation
Most forced migrants enter Jordan on a legal basis with a valid Iraqi passport. A minority is smuggled across the border or enters with a fraudulent passport because of not having been able to secure an intelligence-approved travel document in Iraq. As 
II.5. UNHCR and asylum
In view of the difficult situation they face in Jordan, Iraqi forced migrants have limited strategic choices available to them in order to improve their legal status. The most obvious one is to register as an asylum seeker with UNHCR, even if some know that their claim in unfounded. In the last years, UNHCR's recognition rate of Iraqi asylum seekers in Jordan was 20% in average. Including for those who have no hope of ever becoming "legal" refugees, the registration card provided by UNHCR, and the long delay for treatment of the cases (up to 2 years in case of appeal), allow for taking a legal foothold in Jordan, avoiding possible expulsion, and planning for the future.
As a side effect, and since UNHCR's staff are aware of this tactic, the number of nonbona fide asylum seekers devaluates the asylum claim of those genuinely in need of protection as they are all suspected to be bogus 10 .
In fact, a surprisingly small proportion of Iraqi forced migrant chose UNHCR as an option. Between 1991 and 2000, roughly 30,000 only had sought asylum through the UN agency 11 . There are a number of reasons that might account for this low figure.
Some pertain to a bad knowledge of the functioning of UNHCR's office. As most Iraqis are illegal aliens, keep a very low profile, and go into hiding, they are afraid to come out because they believe that they will be handed over to the Jordanian police for having overstayed. In fact, their view is that UNHCR shares information on cases with the Jordanian authorities. A more serious concern is that Iraqi agents have infiltrated UNHCR, a fear that deters many to approach the organisation. Another type of reason that might explain why relatively few Iraqis present themselves to the organisation is their fear of seeing their claim rejected and of being subsequently deported back to Iraq where, until recently, they incurred death penalty for having claimed asylum abroad.
Finally, a number of those who seem to have genuine cases do not want to approach UNHCR in Jordan, a country that offers temporary shelter but not asylum. They want to choose were they will settle, a difficult thing to do with the resettlement process where host states establish quotas in response to domestic interests and where little scope is left for refugees to choose their final destination. In particular, several Shiite clerics I met had suffered serious persecution at the hands of the intelligence in Iraq, but did not want to register with UNHCR because their aim was specifically to reach London, a major centre of Shiite learning where they had colleagues. They said they intended to seek asylum directly in the UK once they had managed to get there though irregular channels.
II.6. Intentions of further emigration
As most do not achieve either economic or physical security and know that there is little prospect for improvement of their situation, and as their savings diminish rapidly, Iraqi migrants for whom returning to Iraq is not an option start thinking of leaving Jordan for a better place. 98,2% of the respondents stated that they wanted to leave Jordan as soon as possible, and gave as main reasons their bad economic situation, living conditions, and insecure status. Before leaving Iraq, only a minority initially viewed Jordan as a transit stage and had some accurate information about the means at their disposal to move on, and most respondents reckoned that they did not have realistic ideas about visa regulations or employment opportunities in Western countries before reaching Jordan. Once they take the decision to leave Jordan, they are not naive anymore as they have had time to be informed by other migrants who have been there for a longer period.
One of the important sets of information circulating among migrants, and making up for a good part of their discussions, is the possibility of seeking asylum in Western countries. It is accurately said that in some European countries or in Australia the recognition rate of Iraqi asylum seekers is more than twice higher than that of UNHCR in Amman. Besides, in case of rejection of their claims, Iraqis also know that they can stay in Western states as illegal aliens and will not be deported back into Iraq. They hope to find a job with the help of fellow nationals. On the other hand, they also learn that Syria or Lebanon will not offer them substantially better opportunities than Jordan. As a whole, work and security, which they cannot find in Jordan or elsewhere in the Middle East, are available in Europe, in North America or in Australia.
Among the respondents to the survey, only 9,3% had no family member, relative or close friend abroad. Of the remaining 90,7%, 2/3 had family members, relatives or close friends in a Western country, of which 89,6% were either asylum seekers or 
III. NETWORKING FOR SURVIVAL
III.1. Aid and relief from religious institutions and networks
There is no aid and relief provided by Jordanian public or private institutions or by foreign NGOs who are prevented by the authorities to set up projects aimed at Iraqis.
On the other hand, Jordan has a thriving, well integrated local Christian community and Church charities are the only ones allowed to provide aid to Iraqis, mostly in kind. The official possibilities offered by the Jordanian authorities to the Christian community so that it takes care of Iraqi co-religionists stem from the complementary relationship that has historically developed between the Hashemite state and the various Christian Church organisations (Chatelard 1997) . In this context, the religious affiliation of migrants is an important factor to take into account to understand both There is no need to expatiate on the pull factor constituted by the presence of personal or other social networks, a dynamic that has been extensively explored in various studies on international migration (in particular, see Portes 1995; Van Hear 1998; Vertovec and Cohen 1999; Faist 2000) .
"People die like flies nowadays". This is how the immigration officer in the embassy of a Nordic in Amman jokingly put it to explain how Iraqis were abusing humanitarian visas his country grants to foreigners who want to attend the funeral of a relative there. Iraqis, of course, never return and more and more come to the embassy and produce genuine death certificates established by the relevant authorities. They also have the proper documentation to prove their family connection with the deceased. Documents are not necessarily fake as the number of Iraqis in Nordic countries today is large enough to explain that more and more pass away there. But it illustrates that Iraqis are ready to exploit every legal means to migrate and every loophole in the legislation they are aware of, and that social networks are essential means in this regard. These loopholes are numerous and it is not my aim here to list all those Iraqis take advantage of. They are very much the "holes in the wall" D. Bigo (1996) and other analysts of European security policies point at as being left voluntarily by the authorities for a variety of economic reasons linked to the increased need of cheap labour.
But the types of legal holes left put some Iraqis at are more advantage than others.
Australia and Canada have sponsorship schemes for refugees or immigrants. In the case of the latter country, relatives settled in Canada or groups of a maximum five legal entities can submit a sponsorship to the authorities where they have to prove that they can meet the financial needs of the sponsored for the ten years to come. Cases rejected by UNHCR can also reach the Canadian Immigration Board by sponsored files. These cases are dealt with at the embassy in Amman without consulting UNHCR. Comparable schemes are also available for emigration to Australia. Those benefit Iraqi Christians more than their Moslem co-nationals, for the simple reason that Churches have both the financial and legal credentials to act as sponsors, that they are alerted by Church communities in Jordan, or by the Iraqi Christian community in exile whose size is larger than that of the Moslems, and who have had time to organise since their history of emigration to both countries is longer. Once again, it is the Shiites who are at a disadvantage, and also those who are left with no other option than to resort to smugglers in order to leave Jordan.
III.3. The smuggling process and social networks
The techniques and organisations Iraqi migrants resort to in order to reach the West despite the various visa requirements and police constraints are primarily determined by the very same constraints. As R. Koslowsky expresses it:
"Just as states cooperate to control unwanted migration (…), unwanted migrants can cooperate as well to form social networks that facilitate international migration. Just as states deputize private sector actors, such as airlines, to enforce tougher migration controls and thereby change 'the gatekeeper' that confront the prospective migrant, migrants are employing non-state actors, smugglers, to foil restrictions imposed by states, and thereby transform the 'gatecrashers' from hapless peasants who may have never travelled abroad to teams of border crossers led by professionals, often using the latest technologies money can buy". (Koslowsky 2000: 205) Albeit Iraqi forced migrants are in no way "hapless peasants", paying for the services of smugglers or forgers is at the core of their migration strategies. But in Jordan, as in other transit countries in the Middle East, it is impossible to obtain official data on the volume of migrants smuggled out of the country. One exception is Turkey that has allowed IOM to conduct a survey on transit migration on its territory showing that the overwhelming majority were Iraqi Kurds and that very few non-Kurdish Iraqis were transiting that country (IOM 1995 Most of the Iraqi migrants I have talked to who had resorted to smuggling rings stated that they would have rather moved onward legally than breaking immigration laws and taking risks 14 . They said that they only resorted to irregular migration in the absence of legal avenues, and that they could not grasp the motive behind the coupling of stringent border controls with liberal asylum laws. The fact that asylum seekers cannot use legal means to be admitted in countries that offer them proper protection questions the very notion of "smuggling" and the very concept of "illegal" migration. Iraqi migrants themselves, if they do use the Arabic word for "smuggling"
(tahrib), sometimes simply refer to smugglers as "middlemen", if not as "saviours". J.
Morrison, in a report on trafficking and asylum seekers in the UK, argues that: "There is no straight divide between humanitarian and commercial trafficking (…). In some cases the 'agent' (…) is both a criminal and a saver of lives" (Morrison 1998: 1) . For social scientists, smuggling implies a re-conceptualisation of international migration, which is traditionally regarded as a relationship between migrants and a host government aiming at controlling access to its territory. Moreover, smuggling blurs the distinction between legal and illegal migrants as smugglers may deliberately help facilitate legal forms of migration at one stage or another of the migration process.
For example, in international refugee law it is not considered criminal for asylum seekers to enter a country by illegal means. Smugglers, on the other hand, manage to obtain proper visas on proper passports but with fake work certificates and invitation letters. At different stages, migrants thus drift in and out of legal status. about the costs of the trip to "employ" them as prostitutes until they have earned an amount of money considered sufficient to pay for their (and often family members') smuggling out of Jordan. A number of work hours is determined in advance, the money earned is held in trust by the pimp who releases the women and provides them with travel documents only after they have found other women to replace them. There is no need for physical intimidation or isolation strategies as Iraqi women are already isolated, have no way to escape to, and cannot turn to the authorities. Besides they enter into these bonds "voluntarily" in the absence of other survival means. From the literature on women trafficking, there is no other evidence of this debt-bondage being exerted in the transit country and not in the destination country. Generally, traffickers are said to exploit the migrant after being transported across the border, and in the case of prostitution, it is single young women who are involved (Salt and Howarth 2000: 62; Skeldon 2000: 7) . In Jordan, on the other hand, it is mainly women with children or ageing parents, and who are single heads of households.
The fact is that very few of those who recourse to smugglers have the money to pay for the several thousands dollars involved. They have to borrow from friends and relatives who are already abroad and rarely from one single source. Families can rarely support the cost for all their members at once, and a strategic choice has to be made of whom to send first. Frequently, male heads of households travel ahead of the family not only for reconnaissance purposes but also because they leave their spouses and children as guarantees to the smugglers in Jordan until they are able to repay the entire cost of their own trip. But some families chose to send first the wife or a teenage child as they are the most likely to obtain fast recognition of their claim for asylum in the West and can then ask to be reunited with family members left in Jordan.
Because of the costs of irregular migration, Jordan is also a nexus of smuggling rings and social networks. All types of social networks support the move of asylum seekers into the West: kinship networks, political parties, co-ethnics, co-religionists, etc. In the illegal migration process "sending" and "receiving" networks ( Tilly 1990) intersect The role of social and smuggling networks is thus essential in facilitating and sustaining migrations to the West. It is through these networks that migrants gather information, money and by-pass strict entry requirements. But the two types of networks also overlap either because relatives or co-ethnics are the smugglers, or because one or several elements (money, documents) in the overall process are better obtained through a network other than the one which organises the smuggling.
Jordan is a first step that prepares migrants for their future situation in industrialised countries. It is both an antechamber and a training site. In Jordan, migrants will gain access to information about the settings in potential reception countries and they will make a choice, elaborate a strategy. They will also get used to the problems they will face in the West, though less acutely: free movement and integration in the work market, quest for asylum and illegality.
CONCLUSION
Changing focus to observe how and why asylum migrants merely transit in states neighbouring their home countries instead of using them as long term havens challenges the accepted views that migrants who move irregularly to industrialised states had the initial intention to do so, and that mobilisation and recruitment necessarily take place in the country of origin.
The case of the Iraqis forced migrants transiting Jordan illustrates that, for a variety of cultural and practical reasons, a majority of asylum migrants who eventually reach the West irregularly would rather stay in host countries close to their state of origin. It also shows that intercontinental trends of asylum migration cannot be fully understood without looking at a set of interrelated issues in the first countries of reception: their cultural proximity or distance with the country of origin of the migrants, geo-strategic concerns, domestic policies, administrative/legal deficiencies in the treatment of these migrants, discriminatory practices by the authorities or other social agents. These are all factors that can lead to the migrants' poor socio-economic and security conditions, and prompt them to continue emigration towards Western industrialised states where they expect better protection and opportunities.
Furthermore, ethnic and religious affiliations remain primary factors explaining both the discrimination and the survival strategies of asylum migrants in regional host countries in the middle eastern context, and further migration dynamics are strongly dependant on the functioning of transnational networks based on these very affiliations that are not criminal by nature, even if smuggling is involved. The patterns of transit migration across Jordan confirm that "(…) international migrants travel along familiar avenues, circumscribed by strong linkages within or evolving within migration systems and by the example set by earlier movers and the support structures established by them" (Faist 2000: 76) . Social capital is Iraqi migrants' main asset, and among the various components of this capital, kinship and religious ties appear to be those mobilised in priority because they have already gained a transnational dimension. Interestingly enough, these are not activated so much from Iraq as from Jordan, a fact that supports the idea that transnational social mechanisms need such vectors as globalised information, financial and transportation systems.
Once the mechanism is set in motion, it results in the type of chain migration described by T. Faist: "The more immigrants of a given place stay in the destination region, the more want to come" (Ibid: 152-153). But this dynamic has to be supported by a readiness to migrate which, in the case of Iraqi forced migrants, in created not only by the socio-political conditions at home, but also by the type of reception they receive in neighbouring states in their region of origin.
